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Abstract
This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolu
tionary market context. Computational experimental findings are reported for an
evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource-constrained
traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-
Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modelled as two-person prisoner's
dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. Particular attention
is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation
of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade
behavior and social welfare outcomes that these trade networks support.
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1 Introduction •
An evolutionary match-and-play game is an evolutionary game in which the concept .of
rational play is extended to include the choice and refusal of partners as well as the choice of
strategy to play with any given partner. Such games have jjreviouslybeen studied by Stanley
et al. (1994), Ashlock et al. (1996), Hauk (1996), and Tesfatsion (1997a). Other game theory
studies that have allowed players to avoid unwanted interactions,_^or more generally to affect
the probability of interaction with other players through their own actions, include Fogel
(1995), Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989), Kitcher (1993), Mailath et al. (199.4),,and Orbell
andDawes (1993). An extensive review of this work is given in Hauk (1996).,
In addition,^ a growing number of economists have recently begun to explore multi-agent
endogenous interaction systems in which the decision (or state) of an agent depends on the
decision (or state) of certain neighboring agents, where these neighbors may change over
time. See, for example, Brock and Durlauf (1995), De Vany (1996),,Ellison (1992), Epstein
and Axtell (1996), Guriev and Shakhova (1996), Kirman (1997), loannides (1996), Vriend
(1996), Weisbuch et al. (1996), and Young (1993).
The model developed in this study builds on the evolutionary match-and-play trade net
work game (TNG) developed byTesfatsion (1997a) for studying the formation and evolution
of trade networks under alternatively specified, market structures. The primary objective of
this study is to investigate theperformance of the well-known matching mechanism developed
.by Gale and Shapley (1962) when implemented in.an evolutionary market context. .Three
types ofmarket structures are considered: two-sided markets comprising pure buyers and
pure sellers; partially fluid markets comprising pure buyers, pure sellers, and buyer-sellers
capable of functioning as both buyers and sellers; and endogenous-type niarkets comprising
only buyer-sellers. Given each market structure, buyers_and sellers, repeatedly choose and
refuse tradepartners using Gale-Shapley matching, engage in risky trades modelled as two-,
person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. The model is
implemented computationally by means of the .TNG source code developed by McFadzean
and Tesfatsion (1997), which in turn is supported by SimBioSys, ageneral C-h-|- class library
for evolutionary simulations developed by McFadzean (1995).^
To aid in this investigation, various practical and informative descriptive statistics are
constructed for measuring experimentally observed correlations between exogenously given
structural characteristics and the formation and evolution of trade networks, and between
trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that
these trade networks support. These descriptive statistics complement and extend the de
scriptive statistics developed by Stanley et al. (1994), Smucker et al. (1994), and Ashlock et
al. (1996) to characterize play behavior and significant play graphs.
The main conclusion drawn from this study is that the optimality criteria conventionally
used to evaluate the performance of matching mechanisms in static market contexts turn out
to be highly incomplete indicators of performance from an evolutionary vantage point. The
static viewpoint hides the strong role played by market structure and ex ante capacity con
straints in determining the types of persistent matching networks that evolve, the types of
persistent interaction behaviors that these networks support, and the transactions costs and
inactivity costs to agents that the achievement of these persistent networks and behaviors
entails. In addition, the static viewpoint takes preference rankings over potential partners
as given whereas these rankings are continually updated on the basis of past interactions
in evolutionary settings. Indeed, matching behaviors and interaction behaviors evolve con
jointly. This suggests the need for more comprehensive optimality criteria that take both
facets into account.
More concretely, in the market experiments reported below, buyers and sellers determine
their trade partners using "deferred choice and refusal" (DCR). The DCR mechanism is a
version of Gale-Shapley matching that has been suitably generalized to handle two-sided,
partially-fluid, and endogenous-type market structures in which buyers have arbitrary quotas
on the number of trade offers they can make and sellers have arbitrary quotas on the number
of trade offers they can accept. The matching outcomes generated by the DCR mechanism
have been shown [Tesfatsion (1997a)] to have the usual optimality properties associated with
Gale-Shapley matching: namely, pairwise stability; and Pareto optimality from the vantage
^Source code for the TNGand for SimBioSys areboth available asfreeware at the author's Web site, along
with a variety of resource materials for agent-based computational economics in general. All experiments
reported in the current study were run using version 104c of the TNG source code.
point of the agents who actively make offers, who in the current context are the buyers.
The evolutionary .outcomes observed in these market experiments, however, include au-
r
tarkic economies in which all traders are persistent wallflowers, parasitic economies in which
buyers persistently defect against cooperative sellers or sellers persistently defect against co
operative buyers, and harmonious economies in which all traders are persistent cooperators.
Moreover, due to transactions costs and inactivity costs, social welfare can still be loweven if
ail active traders are persistent cooperators. Th^e evolutionary outcomes are systematically
related to market structure and to ex ante capacity constraints as captured by the buyer
offer quotas and seller acceptance quotas.
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 constructs an ex ante measure for excess
capacity and ex post measures for the classification of trade networks, trade behaviors, and
social welfare outcomes. The experimental design is presented in Section 4, and a detailed
discussion of experimental findings is given in Section 5. Concluding'remarks are given in
Section 6.
2 The Basic Model
This section gives a brief overview of the Trade Network Game (TNG) together with the
particular TNG module specifications used for the study at hand. A detailed discussion
of these module specifications, together with their C++.implementation, can>e found in
McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997).
The TNG consists of a collection pf traders that evolves over time. As depicted in Table I,
' * • ' 'u ' i\ ' ,
each trader in the initial generation is constructed and assigned a random trade strategy.
The traders then enter into a nested pair of generation .cycle and trade cycle loops during
which they repeatedly determine trade partners, carry out trades, update their expectations,
and evolve their trade behavior over time.
I > I • ' ' .
In the current study, alternative market structures are imposed through the pre-specification
of buyers and sellers and through the pre-specification of quotas on trade offer submissions
and acceptances. More precisely, the set of traders is taken to be the union V = B U5 ofa
nonempty subset B ofbuyers who can submit trade offers and a nonempty subset S-of sellers
who can receive trade offers, where B and S may be disjoint, overlapping, or coincident. A.
int main () {
Init();
For (G = 1 QMax) {
InitGenO;
For (I= l,...,IMax) {
MatdiTraders();
TtadeO;
UpdateGxpO;
}
AssessFitnessO;
Output();
EvolveGen();
}
Retuiii 0;
}
Conairucl th« initial trader generation
with random trade strategies.
Enter the generation cycle loop.
Generation Cj/ele:
Configure traders with iiser-suppiied
parameter values (initial expected
utility levels, quotas,...).
Enter the trade cycle (oop.
Trade Cycle:
Determine trade partners.
given expected utilities,
and record refusal and
wallflower payoffs.
Implement trades and
record trade payoffs.
Update expected utilities
using newly recorded payofb.
Environmental Step:
Assess trader fitness scores.
Output trader information.
Evolution Siep:
Evolve a new trader generation.
Table I: Pseudo-Code for the TNG
trader is classified as a pure buyer, a pure seller, or a buyer-seller if he is an element of V/S,
V/B, or BnS, respectively. In each trade cycle, each buyer can have no more than bq trade
offers outstanding to sellers at any given time, and each seller can accept no more than sq
trcwie offers from buyers, where the buyer offer quota bq and the seller acceptance quota
sq can be any positive integers. Although highly simplified, these parametric specifications
permit the study of a variety of market structures operating under different ex ante capacity
constraints.
Matches between buyers and sellers in each trade cycle are determined using a modified
version of the well-known Gale-Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance mechanism, hereafter re
ferred to 35 the deferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism.^ Under the DCRmechanism,
each buyer submits up to bq trade offers to sellers he ranks as most preferable on the basis
ofexpected utility and who he judges to be tolerable in the sense that their expected utility
is not negative,^ with at most one trade offer going to any one seller. Similarly, each seller
^See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a caieful detailed discussion of the basic properties of Gale-Shapley
matching mechanisms.
^No buyer-seller is allowed to match with himself This is handled by having each buyer-seller assign a
selects up to sq of his received offers that he finds' tolerable land most preferable on"the basis
of expected utility and he places them on' a waiting hst; all other offers are refused. 'Buyers .
redirect refused offers to 'tolerable preferred sellers who have not yet refused them, if any such
sellers exist. Once sellers stop receiving new offers, they accept all trade offers currently on
their waiting Hsts. A buyer incurs' a transactions cost inithe form of a negative refusal payoff
R whenever a seller refuses-one of his offers duringithe matching'process; the seller who does
the refusing-is not penalized. A trader who neither submits nor accepts-trade offers during
the matching process'receives a wallflower payoff 0. These refusal and wallflower payoffs are
assumed to be measured in futility terms.'' = '
If a seller accepts a trade offer from a buyer in some given trade cycle, the buyer and
seller are said to be matched for that: trade'cycle.. Each-such match-constitutes a'mutually
agreed upon contract stating that the'buyer and seller shall engage in one trade with each
other during the course-of-the trade cycle.*^ This trade is risky, in that outcomes are not
assured. • ^. ' . . > • -. • . • -
Specifically, each trade.between a buyer and seller ismodelled as a two-person prisoner's
dilemma game. Thebuyer can either cooperate (fulfill his 'Contractual':obligations) or defect,
(fail to fulfill these obligations), and similarly for the seller.'For example, the buyer could
be a worker who either works productively or shirks on the job, and the seller could be
an employer who provides a- work environment that is either' satisfactory or substandard.
The range ofpossible utility payoffs is the same for^each trade in'each trade cycle: namely, •
L (the sudcer payoff) is the lowest possible'payoff^ received by a cpoperator'whose trade
partner defects; D is the payoff received 'by a defector whose trade"partner 'also defects;
C is the payoff received by a cooperator whose trade partner also .cooperates; and H (the
temptation payoff) is the highest possible payoff,; received by a defector'Whose trade partner
cooperates. More precisely, the utility payoffs are cissumed to satisfy '< D< Q< C < H,
mth {L-\-H)/2 < C.-' .-T •, • .u ' •- •
The trade behavior ofeach trader in repeated trades with other traders is represented as a
fmite-memory pure strategy for playing a prisoner's-dilemma game with an arbitrary partner
negative initial expected utility to himself, so that he judges himself to bean "intolerable"' trade partner.
^Note this permits a pair of buyer-seller traders v and z to engage in up to two trades with each other
during a trade cycle: namely, one trade in which uacts asbuyer and z.as seller, and a second trade in which
z acts as buyer and v as seller.
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an indefinite number of times, hereafter referred to as a trade strategy. Each trader thus has
a distinct trading personality even if he engages in both buying and seUing activities. At
the commencement of each trade cycle loop, traders have no information about the trade
strategies of other traders; they can only learn about these strategies by engaging other
traders in repeated trades and observing the actions and utility payoffs that ensue. Moreover,
each trader's choice of an action in a current trade with a trade partner is determined entirely
on the basis of his trade history with this partner. Thus, each trader keeps separate track
of the particular state he is in with regard to each of his potential trade partners.
During the course of each trade cycle loop, traders use a simple criterion filter^ to update
their expected utility assessments for their potential trade partners as new utility payoffs
are received. Each trader v starts by assigning the same exogenously given initial expected
utility, U°, to each potential trade partner z with whom he has not yet interacted. Once
interactions with z take place, v calculates his current updated expected utility assessment
for z by forming the average of U° plus all utility payoffs he has received to date from
interactions with z during the course of the current trade cycle loop, including both refusal
payoffs and payoffs received in trades.
Because trade strategies in the TNG are implemented as finite state machines with finite
memory depth, the actions undertaken by any two traders v and z in repeated trades must
eventually cycle. Consequently, as the number of trades between v and z increases, and
assuming neither trader refuses the trade offers of the other, the criterion filter guarantee
that the expected utility that v associates with 2 approaches the true average utility that
Vwould attain from infinitely repeated trades with 2. On the other hand, unless offset by
positive trade payoffs, repeated refusal payoffs eventually lead to a permanent cessation of
trade as the expected utility associated with the trader doing the refusing drops below the
minimum tolerance level, 0.
At the end of each trade cycle loop, the fitness score of each trader is calculated to be the
average per-payoff utility level that he achieved during the course of the preceding loop. The
trade strategies of pure buyers, pure sellers, and buyer-sellers are then separately evolved
^As detailed in Tesfatsion (1979), a criterion filter is a learning algorithm that provides for the direct
updating of an expected return function on the basis of new return outcomes without recourse to the usual
interim updating of probablity assessments via Bayes' Rule.
by means of standardly specified genetic algoritiims involving elitism, mutation, and two-
point cross-over,operations. This .evolution step is meant to-reflect the public® formation
and transmission of new..ideas rather than biological reproduction. Specifically^ if a trade
strategy successfully results in a high fitness score for a trader- of a particular type, other
traders of the same type are led to modify their own strategies to more closely mimic the
successful strategy. Each modified'strategy is'also subjected to a small degree of mutation,
thus permitting the traders to engage in'creative experimentation,as well as mimicry.
After the evolution step,,the memories of the eyolved-traders are.wiped cleanwith respect
to their matching and trading experiences in the preceding trade cycle loop. In particular,
each trader once again assigns an expected utility of V to each potential trade partner. The
next trade cycle loop then commences, and the process repeats.
3 Descriptive Statistics
hi this section, care is taken to explain the ex ante and ex post measures that have been
constructed to aid in the experimental determination of correlations between ex ante market
structure and trade network formation, and between trade network formation and the types
of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that these trade networks support. Trade
networks depict who is trading with whom, and with what regularity. Trade behavior refers
to the specific actions undertaken by a trader in traides with any given trade partner. Fi-'
nally, social welfare measures the overall'utility achieved by the traders froih repeated trade
interactions within the context of a possibly changing network of trade partners.
Let s denote the seed value.for the initialization of theTNG random number generator,
and let e denote a potential economy^ i.e., an economy,characterized structurally by.the
TNG source code together with all of the user-specified TNG parameter values apart from s.
The realized economy generated from e, given the seed value s, is denoted by (5, e). In the
subsections below, it, is first explained how capacity is measured ex ante for any potential
®Since the traders during the course of each trade cycle loop do not know the trade strategies of other
traders, the information transmission during the evolution step must be the result of some form of public
education rather than private introspection-. This artificial distinction between learning about trade partners
through private experience and evolving of trade strategies through public education, helpful in preliminary
experimental stages for enabling some an^ytical treatment of model properties (e.g., criterion,filter perfor
mance), should ultimately be replaced by amore realistic and seamless model of learning encompassing both
matching behavior and trade.strategies.. \
economy e. A distance measure is then constructed to differentiate among observed trade
network formations for reahzed economies (5, e). Finally,'descriptive statistics are developed
to summarize and differentiate among observed types of trade behaviors and social welfare
outcome for reahzed economies (5, e).
3.1 Ex Ante Characterization of Excess Capacity
Given any potential economy e, let A^(e) denote the total number of sellers and let M(t)
denote the total number of buyers. By assumption, each seller in e has the same acceptance
quota sq{e) and eachbuyer in e has the same offer quota'6g(e), where sq(e) and bq(e) canbe
any positive integers. Consequently, the maximum total number of trade offers that sellers
can feasibly accept from buyers during the course of a trade cycle is N{e)sq(e), and the
maximum total number of trade offers that buyers can feasibly have outstanding (i.e., under
consideration by sellers or already accepted by sellers) at any point in time during a trade
cycle is M{e)bq(e).
The excess capacity of e is then measured ex ante by the extent to which potential seller
acceptances outweigh potential buyer offers. More precisely, the (relative) excess capacity of
e is defined to be
^ [Nie)sq{e) - M{e)bq{e)]
M[e)hq{e)
If the number of buyers equals the number of sellers, this measure reduces to the following
simple function of the seller acceptance quota and buyer offer quota:
ECie) = . • (2)
bq{e)
Moreover, if the seller acceptance quota sq{e) is assumed without loss of generality to be no
greater than M{e)bq{e), whidi will be true for all experiments reported below in Section 5,
then —1 < EC{e) < [M{e) —1]. In this case, an economy e will be said to be characterized
by high excess capacity if EC(e) is close to [M{e) —1], zero excess capacity if EC{e) = 0,
tight capacity if EC{e) < 0, and extremely tight capacity if EC{e) is close to -1.
3.2 Ex Post Classification of Trade Networks by Distance
As explained in Section 2, the actions undertaken by any trader v in repeated trades with
another trader must eventually cycle. Consequently, these actions can be summarized in
the form of a trade history ^:P,.-where the handshake H \s Ql (possibly null) string of trade
actions that form a non-repeated pattern and the persistent .portion^ P is a (possibly null)
string of trade actions that are cyclically repeated. For example,: letting c denote cooperation
and d denote-defection,'the trade*history c:c indicates that v cooperated in his first trade
with 2: and>continued to cooperate with 2 in all subsequent trades, whereas ddd:dc indicates
that V defected against z in his first three trades with 2'and.thereafterialternated-between
defection and .cooperation.' . • .
The information that is lost in this summary, representation of the trade history of v with
z is the exact length of the trade history.-. By convention, to-appear an P, an action pattern
must be repeated at least twice; otherwise it assumed to form part of H. Also by convention,
if any trades take place between v and z at^all, then H is always taken to include the initial
action of v in these trades and so will not be null. The length ;and member elements of
P are then uniquely deterirdned, and it is this .unique determination that is used below to
characterize trade network.formation >and trade, behaviors. Note,-.however, that the length'
and member elements of H are not uniquely: determined. For example, the trade history
ccddcddcddcdd has three possible H:P. forms, onefor each' of the .threepossible permutations
ofcdd. as the representationior.the persistent portion P: namely, cicdd, -cciddc, and-ccdidcd.
.Two traders v and -?'are said to,exhibit a persistent trade relationhip during;a given trade
cycle loop T of a realized economy (s,e) if the.following two .conditions hold: (a) their trade
histories with each other during the course ofT take the formHy'.Py and H^iP^ with nonnull
Pv and Pz\ and (b) accepted trade offers'between t; and .zMb'not'permanently cease during T
either by choice (a permanent switch away. to strictly preferred.tradelpartners) or by.refusal
(one trader becoming intolerable to the other because his expected.utility drops below zero). .
Apossible pattern of.trade relationships among the traders ^/(e) in,the,final generation
of apotential economy eisT^eferred to as a. trade network^ denoted generically.by /iL'(e). .Each
trade network K[e) is represented in theform.of a directed graph in which the nodes of the
graph represent the, traders, V'(e), the edges of,theigraph (directed arrows).represent trade
offers directed from buyers to sellers, and the edge weight on any edge denotes the number
of accepted trade offers between the buyer and seller connected by the edge.
Let y(e)'denote a base trade pattern X\iaX partially or fully specifies a potential pattern
of trade relationships among the traders V;(e) in,the final generation.of a,potential economy
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e. For example, V°[e) could designate that each buyer directs trade offers to at least two
sellers. Let K°[e) denote the base trade network class consisting of all trade networks K{e)-
whose edges conform to the base trade pattern V°{e). •
Finally, let K(s,e) denote the trade network depicting the actual pattern of trade re
lationships among the traders V(e) in the final generation of the realized economy (5,.e).
The reduced form trade network K^{s^e) derived iTom.K{s^e) by setting to zero all edge
weights of K{s, e) that correspond to non-persistent trade relationships is referred to as the
persistent trade network for (s, e). An edge of K'^ [s^ e) connecting a buyer-seller pair (u,z)
is depicted as a straight-line or wavy-line directed arrow from t; to z depending on whether
u's submission of trade offers to z are ultimately niade continuously (in each successive trade
cycle) or intermittently (randomly or"recurrently across trade cycles), respectively. In the
former case, v is said to be latched to z.
The distance D^{s,e) between the persistent trade network K^{s,e) and the base trade
network class K°{e) for a' realized economy (6, e) is then defined to be the number of nodes •
(traders) in K^{s, e) whose arrow patterns (persistent trade relationships) fail to conform to
the base trade pattern V^{e). By construction, the distance D°[s^e) is bounded below by 0
and bounded above by the total number of traders in V^(e). This distance measure provides
a rough way to. classify the different types of-persistent trade networks observed to arise for
a given, value of e as the seed value s is varied.
3,3 Ex Post Classification of Behaviors and Welfare Outcomes
A trader u in a realized economy (s, e) is referred to as an unprovoked defector (UD) if he
engages in at least one defection against a trader partner who has not previously defected
against him. The vector giving the separate UD percentages for pure buyers, pure sellers,
andbuyer-sellers in the'final generation of (s, e) is referred toas the UD profile for (5, e). The
UD profile measures the extent to which the different types of traders behave'aggressively
in trades with trade partners who are either strangers or who so far have been consistently
cooperative.
Also, Vis referred to as a persistent wallflower (PW) if v constitutes an isolated node of the
persistent trade network K^{s, e). Alternatively, v is referred to as a persistent defector (PD)
if Vestablishes at least one persistent trade relationship for which the persistent portion P of
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his trade history H:P includes a defection d. If, instead, v establishes at least one persistent
trade relationship and his trade ^history for each of his persistent trade relationships has
the general form H:c^ he is referred to'as a persistent cooperator ' (PC). By construction,
eadi trader in a realized economy (5, e) who is not a persistent wallflower must either be a
persistent defector or a persistent cooperator: '• " ' '
The vectors giving the separate PW, PD, and PC percentages'for pure buyers, pure sell
ers, and buyer-sellers in the final generation,of (s,e) are referred'to as the PW profile, the
PD profile, and the PC^profile for {s,e), respectively. The PW-profile measures the extent
to which the different types of traders fail to establish any persistent trade relationships. In
contrast, the PD and PC profiles measure the extent to which the .different types of traders
establish persistent trade relationships characterized by predacious or fully cooperative be
havior, respectively.
The vector giving the separatemean average fitness scores for pure buyers, pure sellers,
and buyer-sellers in the final generation of a reaUzed economy (5, e) is referred to as the FIT
profile for (5, e). The FIT profile constitutes a measure of social welfare.
4 Experimental Design. , ,
The computer experiments reported in Section 5 focus on three simple market structures:.
.1 r
endogenous-type markets comprising 24 buyer-sellers (MSI); two-sided markets comprising
' • ' ' - • I I ; I I r
12 pure buyers and 12 pure sellers (MS2); and partially fluid markets comprising 8 pure
buyers, 8pure sellers, and8buyer-sellers (MS3). Within each market structure, four different
^ . ' ' ' • . • [ I >I >• ^' ' ' '>' I i. ; . I
configurations for the seller acceptance quota sq and buyer offer quota hq are examined:
high excess capacity (sq » bq); zero excess capacity (sq = bq = 1); tight capacity (sq = 1
and bq = 2); and extremely tight capacity [sq << bq). The genetic algorithm elite value is
automatically adjusted ineach experiment to maintain the elite proportion at approximately
two thirds for each nonzero trader type/
The values for all remaining parameters are maintained at fixed values throughout all
: : • i ! I •
^As detailed in McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997), the elite value specifies how many of the most fit trade
strategic in use'by each type of trader in a current trader generation are inherited without modification
by this same type of trader in the next trader generation. The elite value is set at.,16 for endogenous-type
markets, at 8 for two-sided markets, and at 6 for partially-fluid markets. ' . '
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// PARAMETER VALUES FIXED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
GMax = 50 // Total number ofgeherations.
IMax = 150 // Number of trade cycles in each trade cycle loop.
MutationRate = .005 // GA bit toggle probability.
FsmStates = 16 // Number of internal FSM states.
FsmMemory = 1 // FSM memory (in bits) allocated to past move recall.
RefusalPayoff = -0.5 // Payoff R received by a refused trader.
WallflowerPayoff = +0.0 / / Payoff received by an inactive trader.
Sucker = -1.6 // Lowest possible trade payoff, L.
BothDefect = -0.6 // Mutual defection trade payoff, D. , ^
BothCoop = -1-1.4 // Mutual cooperation trade payoff, C.
Temptation = +3.4 // Highest possible trade payoff, H.
InitExpPayoff =+1.4 //Initial expected utility level,
// PARAMETER VALUES VARIED ACROSS EXPERIMENTS
'' TraderCoimt ="24 //Total nimiber of buyers and sellers.
PureBuyers = 12 //Niunber of ptire buyers.
PureSellers = 12 // Nxunber of pure sellers^
BuyerSellers = 0 //Number of buyer-sellers.
Elite = 8 //.Number of elite for each nonzero trader type.
BuyerQuota =1 // Buyer offer quota bq.
SellerQuota = 12 //Seller acceptance quota sq.
Table II: Parameter Values for a Two-Sided Market with High Excess Capacity
experiments apart from stability checks (see below). Table II lists these fixed parameter
values along with the specific trader type values, quota values, and elite value for a two-sided
market experiment with high excess capacity. The parameter values in Table II, together
with the TNG source code, constitute a potential economy e in the sense defined in Section 3.
Without loss of generality, such e will be represented in Section 5 as a function e(MS,6g,.sg)
of market structure MS and the quota values bq and sq only, with dependence on all fixed
parameter values and the automatically adjusted elite value suppressed. For example, the
potential economy e corresponding to Table II will be referred to as e(MS2,l,12).
As indicated in Table II, the number of generations was set at 50 for each tested potential
economy e. Twenty realized economies (s, e) were experimentally generated for each e using
twenty arbitrarily selected seed values s for the TNG pseudo-random number generator.®
Detailed information about the final (fiftieth) generation of traders in (5, e) was recorded for
each run s. Using this information, the persistent trade network K^{s,e) was graphically
depicted and the UD, PW, PD, PC, and FIT profiles were determined and recorded for each
run s. By construction, for each (5,e), the PD profile.can be derived by subtracting the
®Tiiese twenty seed values are as follows: 5, 10, 15, 20,^25, 30, 45, 65, 63, 31, 11, 64, 41, 66, 13, 54, 641,
413, 425, and 212. The final fifteen values were determined by random throws of two and three die.
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sum of the PW and PC profiles from the exogenously specified profile of trader types for the:
potential economy e. Consequently, only the UD, PW, PC, and FIT profiles are reported in
Section 5. '
A base trade pattern y°(e) was then specified for each tested potential economy e. Al
though the choice of this base trade pattern is^simply a normalization determining a 0 point
for the distance measure D°^ and hence intrinsically arbitrary, the degree of specificity of this
pattern governs the dispersion of the resulting distance values and the extent to which these
distance values display useful correlations with trade behaviors and social welfare outcomes
as measured by the UD, PW, PC, and FIT profiles. For example, a base trade pattern
specifying vacuously that each buyer is either a wallflower or directs trade offers to at least
one seller results in all. trade networks having a distance,value zero whereas a highly specific
base trade pattern could result in all trade networks having a dis^nce value 24. /
In practice, then, the choice of the base trade pattern V?{e) for each tested potential
economy e was fine-tuned so that the r^ulting distance values provided a meaningful in
formative classification of trade ne;twork types. Given V®(e), the distance D'^(s,e) of the
persistent trade network K^[s,e) from the base trade network class K°(e) was recorded for
each run s, and a histogram for the distance values D^{s^e) was constructed giving the
percentage of runs s corresponding to each possible distance value.
Finally, as a rough stability check, the number of generations weis also increased to 100
for each tested potential economy e and theminimum, maximum, and average fitness,scores
for the traders in each of the 100 generations ,were graphically generated for each realized
economy (s,e). In most cases, these fitness score values exhibited remarkable stability over-
generations 25 through 100. Cases in which instabilities were detected are noted in Section 5.
In addition, as a rough check on small sample size, the number oftraders was increased from
24 to 36 with proportionate increases in the number .of traders ofeach type for each market
structure, e.g., an increase from 12 to 18 pure sellers and from 12 to 18 pure buyers for two-
sided market experiments.^ For each experiment conducted with 24 traders, six economes
were also-generated:and examined with 36 traders, keeping all other parameter values and
the base trade pattern the same. In each case, the resulting pattern of.distance values and
associated' UD, PW, PC, and FIT profiles closely resembled those fouiid.for the smaller
population size.
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5 Experimental Findings
5.1 Endogenous-Type Market Experiments
Consider, first, an endogenous-type potential economy e = e(MSl,l,24) comprising 24 buyer-
seller traders, each having an offer quota of hq — 1 and an acceptance quota of sq = 24.
These quota values imply that the maximum number of trade offers that sellers can accept
in any given trade cycle greatly exceeds the maximum niiriiber of trade offers that buyers
can make. Consequently, this e is characterized by high excess capacity EC[t) in the sense
defined in Section 3.1. Moreover, since each seller is individually capable of accepting all of
the trade offers that buyers as a whole can make, the buyers face a zero structural risk of
having their trade offers refused on the basis of limited acceptance capacity.
As depicted in Figure 1(a), the base trade pattern V°(c) for this economy is as follows:
Each buyer-seller trader directs trade offers to other buyer-seller traders without latching.
This base trade pattern implies that no trader functions as a pure seller, and that no trader
directs his trade offers exclusively and continuously to only one trade"partner.
— Insert Figure 1 About Here —
As seen in Table III, 90% of the twenty realized economies (5,e) experimentally generated
for'this e were observed to lie in the distance cluster 0-3. This means that, for each such
realized economy, at most three of the twenty-four traders in the final (fiftieth) trader gener
ation deviate from the base trade pattern. The mean UD profile for this distance cluster is
3%, meaning that the average percentage of traders exhibiting UD behavior in the eighteen
reahzed economies lying in distance cluster 0-3 is 3%. Similarly, the mean PW profile is 1%,
the mean PC profile is 96%, and the mean FIT value is 1.37.® Two outlier cases were also
observed at distance values 11 and 23. Both outliers exhibit more frequent UD behavior and
less frequent PC behavior, and one has a substantially lower social welfare outcome as well.
®In Table III, and in all subsequent tables below, the standard deviations for the UD, PW, and PC profiles
(measured in percentages) appear in parentheses beneath the mean values for these profiles and are rounded
off to the nearest integer value. Also, the standard deviations for the FIT profiles appear in parentheses
below the mean FIT profiiles and are rounded off to two decimal places. The calculation of these standard
deviations is not appHcable (NA) for distance clusters encompassing only one run, i.e., for distance clusters
encompassing only 5% of the total sample of twenty realized economies.
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Cluster % Runs Mean UD, Mean P,W Mean PC .Mean FIT
0-3 90% 3% 1% , 96% 1.37
•
(3%) " (2%) • (4%)- (.05)
. 1 11 • •5% 8% • • 0% 38% • • 1.35 •
(NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) ,
23 5% 96% 0% 88% 1.14
j : 1' • (NA) (NA)' • (NA)-' (NA) • •
Table III: Endogenous-T5T)e Market Experiments with High Excess Capacity
A rough stability check-was conducted for each of the twenty ^realized economies (s,e)
for this high excess capacity econoniy e to check whether'theinformation recorded in Table
III for the final (fiftieth) generations appeared to be informative for other generations as
well. Specifically, holding^all other parameter values and the seed value s'fixed; the nurhber
of generations-was increased to 100 aiid the minimum,-maximum,'and-average fitness scores
attained by the traders ^in each of these-lOO generations were recorded and graphically printed
out. • - • j . . ( ' > ' ' • • '
Figure 2 depicts the stability results obtained'for the realized economy-(413, e) with dis'-'
tance value 0; these results are typical of the'stability results obtained for all economies'
in distance cluster '0-3; The' average fitness score for traders fluctuates closely around the
mutual cooperation payoff level 1.40 over generations 10 through 100. The occasional down
ward spikes in the minimum fitness score correspond to generations in which one or' more
mutant"UD traders induce retaliatory PD and refusaPbehavior in other traders which results
in below-average fitness scores for-the mutants.'The single upward spike iri the maximum
fitness score corresponds .to a generation iri which a'mutant UD trader successfully manages
to establish a parasitical PD trade relationship with a less predacious trade' partner; note
the dip in-the miniinum .fitness score- fnirroring the-upward spike'in''the maximum fitness
score. • ' ' >\ . ' • II " . / . ' f'Ti'. >• v' '
^— Insert Figure 2 About Here —
The dispersion in the distance values e) inTable IILfor the'cross-'sectional sampling
of twenty realized economies, (5, e) 'arises for exactly the same reason that- episodes ofupward
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and downward spiking arise in the time series fitness data depicted in Figure 2: namely, the
presence of mutant UD traders. Moreover, the tight clustering of most of the distance values
about 0 in Table III corresponds to the rarity and brevity of the spiking episodes in Figure
2, and the high percentage of PC behavior seen in Table III corresponds to the fact that the
average fitness score in Figure 2 tends to fluctuate closely around the mutual cooperation
payoif level 1.40.
All of these observations would appear to have a simple -structural explanation. In
endogenous-type economies, all traders evolve together in the evolution step; hence any trade
strategies garnering below-average fitness scores are soon efiminated and replaced with vari
ants of more successful strategies. Consequently, there is a strong evolutionary inducement
towards uniform trade behavior and in particular towards mutual cooperation, the uniform
trade behavior that generates the highest trader fitness scores.
On the other hand, the outlier economy (5, e) realized at distance value 11 demonstrates
that these evolutionary pressures towards mutual cooperation do not always dominate.
Eleven traders in the final generation for this economy end up latched to other traders.
Specifically, one mutant UD trader ultimately latches on to another trader in a mutual PC
relationship, and a second mutant trader engages in UD and PD behavior that provokes
retaliatory PD behavior on the part of 14 other traders. Ten of these 14 PD traders end
up latched to the. mutant PD trader, with the latter getting the worst of the bargain: he
achieves a fitness score of only 0.62 whereas the traders who latch on to him achieve fitness
scores between 1.33 and .1.43. The mean FIT value of 1.35 attained by this economy thus
hides a high degree of intra-generational variation in both trade behavior and fitness scores.
The outUer economy (65, e) realized at distance value 23 is also of interest. Traders in this
economy exhibit a high degree of PC behavior in the first few generations. By generaton 17,
however, most traders are engaging in UD and PD behavior. In generation 18 the economy
suffers a wallflower crash; only three trades take place in each of the three final trade cycles in
generation 18. By generation 50 the economy is still in an unsettled state; 23 of the 24 traders
engage in UD behavior although they ultimately end up in latched PC relationships. By
generation 64, however, the economy has recovered from the wallflower crash; UD behavior is
infrequent and PD behavior is predominant. Indeed, the stability check for this case reveals
that the average fitness score attained by the traders steadily increases towards the mutual
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cooperation payoff level 1.40 over generations 19 through >64'and-fluctuates closely around
1.40 over'generations 64 through 100. ' ....
Consider, next, ah endogenous-type potential economy e =• e{MSl,r,'r) comprising'24
buyer-seller traders with an offer quota bq again-set equal to 1 'but an'acceptance quota sq'
reduced from 24 to 1. This economy e thus has zero excess capacity EC(e), implying that a
trader who randomly or recurrently directs his trade offers-among other traders would now
riskihaving his offers-refused on'the basis of limited acceptalnce capacity. -As depicted in
Figure 1(b), the base trade pattern"V®(e) for this'economy is as follows: Each trader is in
a doubly-latched relationship with another trader. This base trade pattern implies that no
trader functions as a pure'seller. Moreover, given bq'= sq = 1,'each trader must be in an
exclusive, continuous, two-way trade relationship -with jusfone'other trader. ' •
' As seen in Table IV, 100% of the twenty realized economies (s^e) generated for this' e
were observed to lie in the. distance cluster 0^4,- meaning that at most 4 of the 24 traders'
in the final generation of each realized economy deviate from the base trade pattern. These
deviations take two forms: wallflowers; and traders who rotate -their'offers between two
traders instead of. latching on to one. The wallflowers are either UD traders who receive
retaliatory refusal payoffs or cooperative traders who by chance receive so many refusal
payoffs from all potential trade partners that the expected- utility they- assign to each of
these potential trade partners drops below zero.' ' ii •
jC?®'Cluster % Runs Mean.UD Mean PW Mean PC iMean FIT
0-4 100.% 8% 1 2% 1. . 96% . 1.21,.
(22%) (3%) .(5%) (.05)
Table IV; Endogenous-Type Market Experiments with Zero Excess Capacity
Note that the mean FIT value for distance cluster 0-4 in Table'IV is only 1.21, sub
stantially below the mutual-'cooperation payoff level 1.40, despite the fact that 96% of the
traders in this distance cluster exhibit PC'behavior! The explanation for'this relatively low
social welfare outcome is instructive. .
It is not aggression or 'predation in 'the form of' UD or PD behavior that results in low
fitness scores for the traders but rather the large accumulations of refusal payoffs that the
traders incur in their attempts to find trade partners. In particular, refusal payoffs reflect
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the amount of '^ wasted" eJTort that traders expend in the process of attaining a persistent
trade network and hence can be interpreted as transactions costs. These transactions costs
are structurally determined by the form of the matching process and the assumption of zero
excess capacity. They do not arise from trade behavior per se and so cannot be eliminated
by evolutionary selection pressures on trade strategies. This finding cautions that the opti-
mality of the trade networks that arise in evolutionary economic contexts cannot be directly
assessed in terms of social welfare (fitness) outcomes, for these outcomes reflect the partic
ular historical processes by which the trade networks were attained. Rather, care must be
taken to distinguish between the costs of attaining a given trade network starting from some
specified status quo and the benefits of the trade network once attained.
The structural risk of incurring refusal payoffs that arises in the current zero excess
capacity context also explains the very tight clustering of distance values about 0 in Table
rV, reflecting a very high degree of double latching. Traders who fail to latch invariably
accumulate high refusal payoffs. Moreover, once a PC trader v latches on to another PC
trader w, the resulting steady stream of high trade payoffs that w receives from v encourages
w to direct trade offers back to v rather than to other traders who are randomly, recurrently,
or steadily refusing u;'s trade offers.
Consider, next, an endogenous-type potential economy e = e(MSl,2,l) comprising 24
buyer-seller traders with an acceptance quota sq again set equal to 1 but an offer quota bq
increased from 1 to 2. Given these quota values, e exhibits tight capacity EC(e) in the sense
of Section 3.1. In particular, the traders as a whole can place at most half their potential
trader offers in any given trade cycle. As depicted in Figure 1(c), the base trade pattern
V'°(e) for this economy is specified to be the same as in the previous case: Each trader is in
a doubly-latched relationship with another trader.
As indicated in Table V, the twenty reahzed economies (s,e) generated for this e were
observed to lie in two distinct distance clusters. The first distance cluster 2-11 includes 85%
of the realized economies and is characterized by very infrequent UD behavior, very frequent
PC behavior, and a low mean FIT value. The second distance cluster at 24 includes 15% of
the realized economies and is characterized by 100% UD and PW behavior and an extremely
low mean FIT value.
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D° Cluster '%'Runs Mean' UD' 'Mean-PW Mean PC Mean FIT
2-11 85% 1% 1% 98% • '0.98
. (2%), (2%) ,(4%) (.03)
24 15% 100% 100% 0% -0.17
.. - ' ' i ' • (0%) = (0%) • (0%) ''(•00)
Table V: Endogenous-Type Market Experiments with Tight Capacity
f ; I)
The first distance cluster in Table V illustrates how highly asymmetric intra-generational
fitness scores can arise arid persist among-identically behaving PC traders due entirely to
ex ante capacity constraints. In particular, given tight capacity, the high structural risk of
refusal is a strong inducement to "PC behavior among traders when functioning in a buyer
capacity. Nevertheless, tight capacity implies that some traders will fail to place^all of their
trade-offers regardless of their desirability as trade partners. Iri^particular, even if all traiders
exhibit PC behavior, it can happen by chance that some tra;ders repeatedly place both their
tradeoffers while other traders either place no trade offers or have their trade offers accepted
only on a random or recurrent basis.
Specifically, the non-zero distance values in distance cluster 0^11-in Table V arise from
two kinds ofdeviant behavior: (i) PC traders in a doubly-latched relationship who also-latch'
on to a third PC trader (possible since bq = 2) but who refuse the latter trader's offers in
return (since sq = 1); and- (ii) PC traders who latch' on to two other PC traders but who
only recurrently accept .their trade offers in return.- In case" (i), the PC trader latched to two
PC traders achieves a relatively high'fitness score of about r.'25; hisi fitness score is lower
than the mutual cooperation level li40 due-to^refusal payoffs incurred during the process of
finding placements.for his two trade offers: However, the third PC trader who fails to place
any of his trade offers achieves a very low fitness score of about •0.27 (due to his very large
accumulation of refusal payoffs) while the PC trader in the one doubly-latched relationship
receives a relatively low fitness score of about 1.03 due to the refusal payoffs he incurs in
trying unsuccessfully to place-his second trade offer. In case (ii), the PC trader'latched to
two other PC traders achieves a relatively high fitness score of about 1.32 whereas the two
PC traders to whom he is latched achieve a relatively low fitness score ofabout 0.66 due to
recurrent refusal payoffs. For each type ofdeviation the relatively high fitness scores balance
out the relatively low fitness scores. Consequently, the economies in this distance cluster
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all achieve an average fitness score of about 0.98 regardless of the number of traders who
exhibit these deviations.
The second distance cluster at 24 in Table V consists of three realized economies (s.e)
characterized by 100% UD and PW behavior. Indeed, for each of these economies, all traders
in the final (fiftieth) generation are initial defectors who rapidly degenerate into PWs as
refusal payoffs accumulate due both to retaliation and to capacity constraints. Economies
for which this occurs will hereafter be referred to as wallflower economies. The stability
checks for these three economies indicate that each economy actually becomes a wallflower
economy very early on, by generation 10 at the latest, and remains a wallflower economy
through generation 100. In short, there is complete coordination failure in each of these
three economies.
Finally, consider an endogenous-type potential economy e = e(MSl,24,l) comprising 24
buyer-seller traders with an acceptance quota sq again set equal to 1 but an offer quota
bq increased all the way to 24. In this case, capacity is extremely tight and traders face an
extraordinarily high structural risk of incurring refusal payoffs if they randomly or recurrently
distribute their trade offers among other traders. As depicted in Figure 1(d), the base trade
pattern V°(e) for this economy is specified to be the same as in the previous two cases: Each
trader is in a doubly-latched relationship with another trader.
The distance clusters and corresponding behavioral profiles determined experimentally
for this extremely tight capacity Ccise, presented in Table VI, are similar to those for the
tight capacity case depicted in Table V. A simple structural reason can be given for this
similarity. Once a trader receives enough refusal payoffs from another trader to drop his
expected utility assessment for that trader below zero, he stops directing trade offers to
that trader. Consequently, there is an inherent upper bound to the transactions costs that
traders can sustain from the increased risk of refusals resulting from an additional tightening
of capacity. As Tables V and VI also indicate, however, moving from tight to extremely tight
capacity results in the realization of twice as many wallflower economies.
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D° Cluster % Rims Mean UD Mean PW Mean PC •Mean FIT
2-12 - 70%- 3% • '3% 94% 0.92
(5%) (7%) (9%) . (-06)
24 . 30% 100% 100% 0% -0.16
t , (0%) • (0%) (0%) • (-00)
Table VI: Endogenous-Type Market Experiments with Extremely Tight Capacity
'V ' •
5.2 Two-Sided Market Experiments
t • i
Consider the c^e of a two-sided potential economy e = e(MS2,l,12) comprising 12 pure
buyers and 12 pure sellers with each buyer having an offer quota bq = 1 and each seller
having an acceptance quota sq = 12. These quota values indicate that the economy e is
characterized by high exc^s capacity EC,(e) in the sense defined in Section 3.1. In particular,
the structural risk to buyers of having their offers,refused ,by sellers on the basis of limited
acceptance capacity is zero. On the other hand, unlike buyer-sellers,.pure;sellers are forced to
be inactive unless buyers happen to direct trade offers their way. Consequently, in contrast to
endogenous-type economies with high excess capacity, the sellers .in-,this;two-sided economy
with high excess capacity, face a substantial structural risk,of incurring wallflower payoffs.
The economy e thus represents a "buyers' market." •As depicted in. Figure, 3(a), the base
trade pattern V°{e) for this economy e is as follows: Each buyer is latched to at least one
seller, and no seller is a wallflower. • j • i • , , • .
Insert Figure 3 About Here
f "i
As seen in Table VII, 75% of the twenty, realized economies (.«s,-e) generated for this e
were observed to lie in the distance cluster 3-9 and 25% were observed to lie in,the distance
cluster 23-24. In the first distance cluster, sellers achieve a very low mean FIT value of only
0.37. This results, from two factors: the high accumulation of wallflower, payoffs by sellers
due to high excess capacity; and the high percentage of UD and PD,_ behavior exhibited
by buyers. Indeed, the persistent trade networks for this first distance cluster reveal that
UD and PD buyers typically latch on to a selected subset of PC or less,predacious sellers
and drive down their fitness scores to small positive values, causing,the remaining sellers to
become PWs with fitness scores close to 0; the nonzero distance values in distance cluster
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3-9 are essentially a count of the sellers who become PWs. This buyer behavior ensures that
the parasitized subset of sellers fare relatively well in the evolution step, due to the separate
evolution of pure buyers and pure sellers, and so reproduce into the next generation. This
in turn ensures a continual source of hosts for the buyers to prey upon.
Cluster % Runs Mean UD Mean PW Mean PC Mean FIT
PB PS PB PS PB PS PB PS
3-9 75% 97% 16% 2% 40% 3% 39% 1.76 0.37
(5%) (34%) (3%) (12%) (5%) (28%) (.25) (.15)
23-24 25% 2% 5% 2% 5% 98% 95% 1.39 1.03
(3%) (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%) (7%) (.00) (.00)
Table VII: Two-Sided Market Experiments with High Excess Capacity
In the second distance cluster in Table VII, sellers achieve a mean FIT value of 1.03 that
is substantially below the mutual cooperation payoff level 1.40 despite the high percentage
of PC behavior exhibited by both buyers and sellers. This low mean FIT value results from
the large number of wallflower payoffs that sellers accumulate due to high excess capacity,
a structural cause that is independent of how cooperatively the sellers behave in their trade
interactions. The typical trade pattern exhibited in this distance cluster is buyers directing
trade offers among sellers without latching.
Consider, instead, the case of a two-sided potential economy e = e(MS2,l,l) comprising
12pure buyers and 12 pure sellers in which each buyer again has an offer quota 6^ = 1 but the
acceptance quota sq of each seller is reduced from 12 to 1. This economy e is characterized
by zero excess capacity EC(e), implying that buyers who randomly or recurrently distribute
trade offers among sellers now face a structural risk of refusal due to limited acceptance
capacity. In contrast, the structural risk to sellers of incurring wallflower payoffs by chance
is now zero. Consequently, e is tilted towards being a "sellers' market." As depicted in
Figure 3(b), the base trade pattern ^"(6) for this economy e is as follows: Each buyer is
latched to exactly one seller, and no seller is a wallflower.
As seen in Table VIII, 80% of the twenty reahzed economic (5, e) for this e were observed
to lie in the distance cluster 0-2. Also, one reahzed economy was observed at distance value
4 and three realized economies were observed at distance value 24.
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D° Cluster % Runs ' - Mean UD Mean PW '' 'Mean PC' Mean FIT
PB ' PS, PB ,ES -.PB ,PS PB , PS
0-2 80% 15% 22% 1% 1% 94% 86% 1.08 1.34
(32%) (38%) (3%) • (3%) (6%) (25%) (.20) (.20)
4 • 5% 100% 100%' 17% 17% •0%' 0% 0.6T 0.32
(NA) (NA), (NA), (NA), (NA) , (NA) (NA) (NA)
24 15% 0% 22% 0% 8% 89% 78% 0.24 1.42
(0%) (20%) "(0%) (o%r (16%) "(20%) (.08) '(.06)
•, I • . . • . . • . , • •
Table VIII: Two-Sided Market Experiments with Zero Excess Capacity
The mean FIT value for buyers in the distance cluster 0-2 in Table VIII is low relative
to the mean FIT value for sellers; indeed,' buyers attain a lower mean FIT value than sellers
in all but 1 of the 16 reahzed economies in this distance cluster.^The reason for "this is
the rather heavy accumulation of refusal payoffs that buyers incur" in 'the course of finding
their trade partners. Even though the economies in'this distance cluster'end up in a highly
coordinated state, with almost all traders engaging in PC behavior in doubly-latched pairs,
each buyer typically accumulates 2 or 3 refusal payoffs frorh a wide range of sellers on the
way to achieving this coordinated state. ' ' • -
Strong evolutionary inducements exist' for traders of a particular type to exhibit similar
trade behavior since they are evolved together in the evolution step. Given the structural
risk of refusal already faced by buyers, it is therefore not surprising to see in Table'VIII
that buyers in the distance'cluster 0-2 largely evolve into PCs to avoid retaliatory refusal'
payoffs. The question arises, however, why sellers'largely' cooi-diriate on PC behavior rather
than engaging in-more frequent UD/PD^ behavior to take advantage' of the relatively weak
position of buyers in this zero excess capacity context. For example, in the realized economy
(641, e) with distance value 0', all sellers coordinate on the UD behavior cd:c against buyers
imiformly engaged in the PC behavior c:c, resulting in a FIT value for'sellers of1.47 that is'
higher than the mean FIT value of 1.34 that sellers achieve in distance cluster 0-2. However,
seller coordination on UD/PD behavior is observed in only 3 ofthe 16 realized economies in
distance 'cluster 0-2. . . ^ .
The reahzed economy at distance value 4 in Table VIII has several unusual features: for
example, trade histories with exceedingly long handshakes and persistent portions (e.g., 26
actions in H and 28 actions in P), a' great variation in fitness scores' among traders' of the
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same type, and a mean FIT value for pure buyers that exceeds the mean FIT value for
sellers. The three realized economies at distance value 24 also exhibit unusual features, such
as exceedingly high refusal payoffs for buyers and a lack of any latching.
The stability checks conducted for the realized economies at distance values 4 and 24
reveal that the average fitness scores achieved by successive trader generations in these
economies over generations 1 through 100 display persistent drifting (distance value 4).
cycling (distance value 24, 5 = 413), or bubbles (distance value 24, s = 63 and .s = 31).
On the other hand, many of the realized economies in the distance cluster 0-2 also exhibit
unsettled fitness score behavior over generations 1 through 100 in the form of persistent
drifting, bubbles, or regime shifts. The reason for this appears to be that trade network
formations are particularly fragile in this zero excess capacity context since they form in
response to refusal payoffs and yet support largely PC or even c:c trade behavior. For
example, a c:c economy with distance value 0 (complete latching with no current refusals)
can suddenly revert to an economywith distance value 24 (no latching and a high number of
refusals) if a mutant c:c buyer enters the economy and disrupts current latched relationships
by randomly scattering trade offers across sellers in successive trade cycles. The latter
scenario arises, for example, in the final generation of the realized economy (413, e) with
distance value 24.
Consider, next, the case of a two-sided potential economy e = e(MS2,2,l) comprising 12
pure buyers and 12 pure sellers in which each seller again has an acceptance quota sq = I
but the buyer offer quota bq is increased from 1 to 2. This economy e is characterized by
tight capacity ECie) in the sense of Section 3.1. In particular, buyers can now place at most
half their potential trade offers in each trade cycle, implying they face a high structural risk
of refusal, whereas the structural risk to sellers of incurring wallflower payoffs by chance
remains at zero. Consequently, e is a "sellers' market." As depicted in Figure 3(c), the base
trade pattern V(e) for this economy e is as follows: Each buyer directs trade offers to sellers
without latching, and no seller is a wallflower.
As seen in Table IX, 55% of the twenty realized economies (s,e) generated for this e
were observed to lie in the distance cluster 0-7. The typical trade behavior exhibited in this
distance cluster is c:c buyers directing their two trade offers randomly among cx sellers, who
are forced by the acceptance quota sq — I to refuse all but one trade offer in each trade
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cycle. Consequently, buyers accumulate large numbers of refusal payoffs-in-each trade cycle
and achieve a very low mean FIT value of only 0.32 despite mutually cooperative trade.
Deviations from the base trade pattern consist'largely of buyers who become wallflowers
by chance when they receive so many ^efusal payoffs from sellers that all'sellers become
intolerable' to them. Two other forms of deviation also infrequently occur: c:c buyers'who
manage to latch .on to a c:c seller when refusals (due to hmited. .capacity) make the seller
intolerable to-alLother. buyers; and UD sellers who become wallflowers when all buyers direct
their offers elsewhere.' The latter deviations .explain whythe-mean FIT value of 1.37 for
sellers in distance.cluster 0-7 is:jbelow the mutual.cooperation'payoffilevel 1.40.
D® Cluster % -Runs • Mean UD- ' Mean'PW Mean PC ' Mean FIT
PS PB PS PB -..PS PB PS
0-7 55% . 2%
(3%)
5%
(9%)
19%
(10%)
4%
(7%)
81%
(10%)
96%
'(6%)"
0.32
(.06)'
1.37
(.06)
24 45% 100%
(0%)
oo 82%
(26%)
77%- •
.(34%)
3%
(8%)
5%
(13%)
-0.05
(.44)
0.27
(.40)
Table IX: Two-Sided Market Experiments with Tight Capacity
I \
Table IX also reports that nearly all traders-in the nine reahzed economies lying in
distance cluster 24, exhibit UD'behavior, a'dramatically different outcome from the pre
dominantly c:c trade'behavior observed for distance cluster 0-7. In three of these realized
economies, all traders end up either in latched PD relationships or as PWs,'with buyers
attaining a mean FIT value of 0:39- and sellers attaining a mean FIT value of 0.83.' The
stabihty checks for these three reahzed economies reveal that two of them exhibit unsettled
behavior over generations 1 through 100 in the form of a-drifting average fitness score and
the third suffers a wallflower crash in generation 60 that-persists through gene'ration 100.
In the remaining six realized economies lying in distance cluster 24, all traders are initial
defectors and end up as PWs. Indeed, the stability checks for these economies reveal that
they become wallflower economies by at most the tenth generation and remain wallflower
economies through generation 100.
Finally, consider the case of a two-sided potential economy e = e(MS2,12,l) comprising
12 pure buyers and 12 pure sellers in which each seller again has an acceptance quota sq = 1
25
but the buyer offer quota bq is increased all the way to 12. This economy e is charcicterized
by extremely tight capacity EC{e) in the sense of Section 3.1. In particular, any one buyer
is now potentially capable of exhausting all seller capacity in the economy, hence buyers face
an extraordinctrily high structural risk of refusal. On the other hand, sellers still face zero
structural risk of becoming wallflowers by chance. This e is therefore a ''sellers' market."
As depicted in Figure 3{d), the base trade pattern V®(e) for this e is as follows: Each seller
accepts trade offers randomly from exactly two buyers, and no buyer is a wallflower.
As seen in Table X, the twenty realized economies (5,e) generated for this e form three
distinct distance clusters. In distance cluster 0-6. active traders are predominantly engaging
in c:c trade behavior. The most frequent deviations from the base trade pattern are c:c
buyers who become PWs by chance when they receive so many refusals from sellers due to
Umited capacity that all sellers become intolerable to them (9 cases), and c:c sellers who
either have one buyer latched on to them or who accept offers randomly from more than
two buyers (7 cases). Other less frequently observed deviations consist of UD buyers who
become PW by retahatory refusals (1 case), UD sellers who induce retaHatory PD behavior
in a buyer that leads the buyer to latch on to the seller (2 cases), and one c:c seller who
becomes a PW by chance-
In contrast, in the four realized economies in distance cluster 15-17, nearly all sellers
are UDs and all traders end up either in latched relationships (predominantly PD) or as
PWs. The stability checks for these economies indicate that all exhibit an unsettled drift
in average fitness score over generations 1 through 100. Finally, the 9 economies with dis
tance value 24 are wallflower economies in which all traders are initial defectors and end
up as PWs. The stability checks for the latter economies reveal that these economies be
comewallflower economies by the eighteenth generation at the latest and remain wallflower
economies through generation 100.
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D° Cluster % Runs • Mean .UD. -Mean PW Mean'PC Mean FIT
: PB - PS PB PS PB PS' . PB PS
0-6 35% - 1% • 1% 12% 1% 86% 96% 0.32 1.38
1 (3%) (3%) (4%) (3%) (7%) (6%) (.05) (.05)
15-17 20% - 10% 92% . 35% 2% 17% 25% 0.40 • 1.24
* (14%) Cl4%) (7%) (4%) (20%) (34%) (.21) (.19)
24 45% 100% :100% 100% 100%. •0% 0%. :^.0.10 -0.01
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (.00)- (.00)
I I
Table X: Two-Sided Market Experiments with Extremely Tight Capacity
5,3 Partially-Fluid Market Experiments
Consider the case of a partially fluid p9tential economye = e(MS3,l5l6) with 8 pure buyers, 8
pure sellers, and,8 buyer-sellers, and.^yith a buyer,offer quota bq= \ and a seller acceptance
quota sq = 16.. This economy ,e has high excess capacity in the, sense .of-Section,3.1 and
constitutes a "buyers' market." On the one hand,, each seller is individually capable of
accepting all potential trade offers by buyers, implying that buyers,face zero,structural risk
of refusal. On the other hand, pure selleirs face a substantial, structural risk of receiving
wallflower payoffs .because of the relatiye scarcity of trade offers. As" depicted in Figure-4(a),
the base trade pattern V(e) for this.^economy.e, is as. follows: Each pure buyer and buyer:
seller directs trade offers to buyerrsellers and/or .pure sellers ^w:ithout latdiing, and no pure,
seller is a wallflower.
— Insert Figure 4'About Here —
, , , • < I i . , .
As seen in TableXI, the.-twenty economies (5, e) generated for this partially fluid economy
e with high excess capacity, are fairly evenly divided among three,distinct distance clusters.
In distance cluster0-2, the relatively low mean^FIT value for pure sellers is due primarily to
large accumulations of wallflower payoffs resulting ironi high excess capacity; UD. behavior
is relatively infrequent and almost all traders are PCs. • . ,,
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. I'
% of Mean UD Mean PW Mean PC Mean FIT
Cist. R\ins PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS
0-2 30% 2% 2% 6% 2% 2% 0% 98% 98% 81% 1.39 1.02 1.36
(5%) (5%) (10%) (5%) (5%) (0%) (5%) (5%) (32%) (.00) (.00) (.06)
6-9 35% 25%
(40%)
00>-«
39%
(41%)
14%
(35%)
41%
(48%)
0%
(0%)
75%
(40%)
48%
(41%)
64%
(38%)
1.16
(.11)
0.73
(.25)
.1.25
(.09)
16-21 35% 98% 23% 98% 16% 30% 2% 18% 40% 21% 1.15 0.57 1.44
(4%) (38%) (4%) (35%) (30%) (4%) (34%) (37%) (35%) (.63) (.28) (.29)
Table XI: PartiaUy-Fluid Market Experiments with High Excess Capacity
In distance cluster 6-9, the mean FIT value for pure sellers is further depressed by
the increased frequency of their own UD behavior, which provokes retahatory PD behavior
or refusals from buyers, and by the more frequent UD behavior of buyers which provokes
retahatory PD behavior in some pure sellers. The UD and retahatory PD behavior by
buyers who interact with UD pure sellers and with UD buyer-sellers in their capacity as
sellers tends to lower the mean FIT value of buyers as weU. Interestingly, in two of the
seven realized economies in this distance cluster, all pure sellers exhibit UD behavior and
degenerate rapidly into PWs, leaving the pure buyers and buyer-sellers to form their own
persistent trade network. In another realized economy, it is the pure buyers who exhibit UD
behavior and soon degenerate into PWs, leaving the buyer-sellers and pure sellers to form
their own persistent trade network. Finally, for two other reahzed economies, UD buyer-
seller behavior leads to the near-complete ostracism of buyer-sellers by other traders, with
the buyer-sellers then essentially forming one isolated persistent trade network and the pure
buyers and pure sellers forming another. Note that buyer-sellers are the only trader type
able to thrive on their own.
Finally, in the distance cluster 16-21, the mean FIT value for pure sellers is further
reduced due to the now frequent UD and PD behavior exhibited both by pure buyers and by
buyer-sellers, nearly all of whom are latched to the pure sellers. Indeed, in six of the seven
reahzed economies in this-distance cluster, buyer-sellers act as pure buyers only, and all but
one buyer-seller is latched to a pure seller. Buyers latched to the same pure seller tend to
display similar trade behavior, whether they are pure buyers or'buyer-sellers. The seventh
realized economy in this distance cluster is also of interest: all pure sellers are initial defectors
who degenerate into PWs; all pure buyers are UDs who latch on to a single buyer-seller, with
all but one exhibiting PD behavior in this latched relationship; and all buyer-sellers direct
their trade offers to other buyer-sellers and engage in PC trade behavior with each other.
28
The stabiUty checks for the twenty realized ecorioimes (sje) generated for this partially
fluid economy e with high excess capacity reveal unsettled fitness score behavior over gener
ations 1 through 100 in the form of a wallflower collapse (1 case), bubbles (2 cases)-, regime
shift (6 cases), and persistent drifting (4 cases). It was at first conjectured that this observed
instability might be due to the small population size of 8 for each trader type. Surprisingly,
however, when six,realized ecpnomies, were rerrun with;an increased populaUon size.of 12
for each trader type, keeping all other parameter values,^fixed, the resulting distance values,
trade^behaviorSj and social .welfareoutcomes closely resembled those obtained for the smaller
population size. It therefore .appears tha;t,the observed instabilities may instead be due, to
the fluid role played by:.buyer-sellers. In particular, the ability of buyer-sellers to function
either as buyers or as sellers permits them to crowd out the-pure sellers or the pure buyers,
thus causing them to degenerate into P,Ws., In addition,,buyer-sellers have thc'unique ability
to form a self-suflRcient network of trade relationships without the participation of, either
pure buyers or pure sellers. . , , ,
Consider the case of a partially fluid ipotentiabeconomy e = e(MS3,l,l) with a buyer
offer quota bq again set.equal to 1, but a seller acceptan^ quota 5^ decreased'from 16 to
1. This economy e is ^characterized by,zero excess,capacity EC(e), in the sense of Section
3.1, which tilts the_ economy back towards being a, "sellers' market." -In particular, buyers
who distribute offers recurrently or randomly a,niong sellers now. face a structural risk of
incurring refusal payoffs from sellers on the basis of limited acceptance capacities, whereas
the structural risk to pure sellers of receiving wallflower payoffs due to excess, capacity has
been eliminated. As depicted in Figure^4(b), the base trade,pattern l(°(e) for this economy
e is as follows: Each pure buyer ,is latched to^one buyer-seller, each buyer,-seller,is latched to
one pure seller, and no pure seller is a wallflower.^ , , .
Table XII reports the distance values, trade behaviors, and,social welfare outcomes ob:
served for this partially fluid economy e with zero,^excess ,capa-city..- A comparison of these
findings to the much more diffuse .findings reported in Table XI .for high excess capacity
indicates the extraordinarily strong disciphnary role played by ex ante capacity constraints
in the determination of evolutionary outcomes for partially fluid economies.
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D°
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD Mean PW Mean PC Mean FIT
PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS
0-6 80% 6%
(24%)
20%
(10%)
9%
(24%)
0%
(0%)
1%
(3%)
2%
(4%)
98%
(4%)
92%
(24%)
97%
(5%)
1.16
(.06)
1.42
(.15)
1.13
(.12)
16-24 20% 100%
(0%)
28%
(42%)
47%
(47%)
28%
(42%)
25%
(31%)
•6%
(11%)
0%
(0%)
19%
(14%)
53%
(47%)
0.21
(.18)
0.91
(.28)
0.91
(.19)
Table XII: Partially-Fluid Market Experiments with Zero Excess Capacity
' I '
Specifically, as seen in Table XII, 80% of the twenty realized economies (5, e) generated
for this zero excess capacity e were observed to lie in the distance cluster 0-6. Indeed,
40% of these economies actually have distance value = 0, meaning that 100% of the
traders in the final generations for these economies are coordinated into disjoint trading
triads consisting of one pure buyer latched to one buyer-seller who in turn is latched to one
pure seller. Moreover, nearly all traders in the distance cluster 0-6 exhibit PC behavior.
The relatively low mean FIT values for pure buyers and buyer-sellers in this distance cluster
are largely the result of refusal payoffs accumulated by chance. The mean FIT value for
buyer-sellers is also reduced by the UD and PD behavior engaged in by some pure sellers
against largely PC buyer-sellers. This UD and PD behavior by pure sellers also explains why
the mean FIT value of 1.42 for pure sellers is slightly higher than the mutual cooperation
payoff level 1.40. Deviations from the base trade pattern in this distance cluster consist of
occasionally broken triads, e.g., a pure buyer latched directly to a pure seller with the extra
buyer-seller appearing either as a PW or as an extra link inserted between a pure buyer and
a buyer-seller in what otherwise would be a base trade pattern triad.
The four realized economies in distance cluster 16-24 are dominated by the following
types of deviations from the base trade pattern: widespread failure of pure, buyers to latch
with buyer-sellers and of buyer-sellers to latch with pure sellers (one case); widespread di
rect matching between pure buyers and pure sellers; with buyer-sellers latched largely among
themselves (two cases); and pure buyers degenerated into PWs by refusal, pure sellers de
generated into PWs by chance, and buyer-sellers latched among themselves (one case). The
reason for the relatively high frequency of PC behavior among buyer-sellers in this distance
cluster results from the fact that, in three fourths of the realized economies in this distance
cluster, the buyer-sellers end up matched largely among themselves. As seen for endogenous-
type econoniies, self-matching generally induces mutual PC behavior among buyer-sellers.
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Now^consider the case of a partially fluid potential economy e = e(MS3,2,l-).with a seller,
acceptance quota sq again set equal to 1 but a buyer offer quota 'increased from I. to 2.
This economy e is characterized by tight^ capacity.£?C(e) in the sense of Section 3.1,.-and
constitutes,a "sellers' market." ,In particular,• buyers who distribute,.trade offers-recurrently
or randomly-among sellers now face.a high structural risk of incurring refusals from sellersion-
the basis of limited acceptance capacities whereas the structural risk: to sellers o"f incurring
wallflower payoffs by chance-is zero.-: As depicted in Figure 4(c), the basetrade-pattern V°[t)
for this economy e is as follows: Each pure buyer directs trade-offers to at least two sellers
(bs. and/or ps), each-buyer-seUer functions as aSpure,seller.(i.e., He does not make any trade
offers) and no trader is a wallflower.. • ..u '.- . ^ , : / <'1.
As seen in Table XIII, 75% of the twenty realized economies (5,e) generated for this
tight capacity economy e lie in.distance cliister 0-7,'y)% are at distance value 10, and 15%
are at" distance value 24. In distance cluster 0-7,- over three-fourths of the'itraders ejdiibit
PC behavior. Nevertheless, pure buyers and buyer-sellers achieve lower mean FIT values
than pure sellers due "primarily to large accuniulations of refusal payoffs resulting from tight
capacity. Buyer-sellers do better thaii pure buyers since alinost all'of them end up functioning
as pure sellers in this sellers' market; but tliey typically" still incur niany refusal payoffs in
the process of attaining this persistent state. ,-.n , i u. u
D° % of
Runs
Mean UD, f.MeeinPW, ... ' Mean PC >; ' . Mean FIT, t • .
Cist. PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS
0-7 75%, .2% .19%-- 17% 6% . 4% , . -1% •75% 80%. 83% . o:66 • '1.33. 0.93
(4%) (38%) (34%) (8%) (7%) (3%) (28%) (38%) (34%) (.19) (.18) (.08)
10 ,10% . 0%
(0%)
50%,
(50%)
' 0% ,
(0%)
19%
(6%)
44%
(44%)
50% .
(50%)
: 81%,.'
(6%)
- 56%; •
(44%)
50%,
(50%)
0.35
(.11)
! 0.88 '
(.49)
' 0.46 :
(.49)
24 15% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% :100% -• 0%.., . ,0% , 0% • -0.13 -0.02 -o;i3
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (.00) (•00) (.00)
'•.'1
Table XIII: Partially-Fluid Market Experiments with Tight Capacity,
. In one of the two economies at distance value^ 10^ buyer-sellers exhibit UD behavior
and degenerate rapidly into PWs. In the-second>.economy at' distance'value 10,-it is the
pure sellers .who exhibit UD behavior and degenerate rapidlyintb PWs. Consequently' UD
behavior appears to be risky for'sellers'>even in this sellers"market since biiyeir-sellers^and
pure sellers must compete against each other for the attention of the pure buyers. Finally,
the three economies at distance value 24 are wallflower economies in which each trader is
an initial defector. The structural checks for the latter economies reveal that they become
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wallflower economies by generation 5 at the latest, and they remain wallflower economies
through generation 100.
Finally, consider the case of a partially fl.uid potential economy e = e(MS3.1,16) with
a buyer offer quota bq again set equal to 1 but a seller acceptance quota sq now increased
all the way to 16. This economy e is characterized by extremely tight capacity EC{€) in
the sense of Section 3.1. In particular, buyers who distribute offers recurrently or randomly
among sellers now accumulate exceedingly high numbers of refusal payoffs. As depicted in
Figure 4(d), the base trade pattern V°{e) for this economy e is as follows: Each trader is
a wallflower. As seen in Table XIV, 75% of the twenty realized economies (3,e) for this
economy e with extremely tight capacity have distance value 0, implying they are wallflower
economies.
D"
Cist.
% of
Runs
Mean UD Mean PW Mean PC Mean Fl 1
PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS PB PS BS
0 75% 100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
100%
(0%)
0%
(0%)
o
0%
(0%)
-0.13
(.00)
-0.02
(.00)
-0.13
(.00)
16 5% 0%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
100%
(NA)
25%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
25%
(NA)
38%
(NA)
88%
(NA)
0%
(NA)
0.57
(NA)
1.33
(NA)
0.58
(NA)
23-24 20% 0%
(0%)
6%
(11%)
3%
(5%)
0%
(0%)
3%
(S%)
0%
(0%)
97%
(5%)
97%
(5%)
97%
(5%)
0.40
(•07)
1.37
(.05)
0.82
(.06)
Table XIV: Partially-Fluid Market Experiments with Extremely Tight Capacity
In each (s,e) at distance value 0, all traders in the final generation engage in initial
defections. Since the chance of forming persistent trade relationships is essentially zero due
to the exceedingly high structural risk of refusal, traders who do best are those who defect
from the very first trade. As the stability checks for these economies indicate, however, the
resulting retaliatory refusals on top of structurally generated refusals causes these economies
to degenerate almost immediately into wallflower economies and to persist as wallflower
economies through generation 100. As seen in Table XIV, the few realized economies {5,e)
that manage to achieve positive distance values, and hence to escape becoming wallflower
economies, are those in which traders largely avoid UD and PD behavior. The typical trade
pattern observed for these latter economies is as follows: Each buyer is directing offers to
sellers without latching, and each pure seller is accepting offers recurrently from exactly two
buyers.
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6 Concluding Remarks - •
Among the more interesting experimental findings detailed in Section 5, two stand out.
First, for many of the tested potential economies e, the distance values for the persistent
trade networks K^{s,e) tend to cluster around two or three isolated distance values, and
the mean distance of each distance cluster tends to be strongly correlated with the,mean
UD, PW, PC, and FIT profiles calculated, for the distance cluster. For such economies,
then, there does not appear to l^e any central-tendency network 'in the sense defined by
Banks and Carley (1994)' but rather a number of different local basins of attraction. One
possible explanation for these distinct distance clusters is that they correspond to multiple
Nash equilibria for the underlying evolutionary match-and-play game in wKich tlie' traders
axe paxticipating. •On the other hand, the distinct distance clusters could be artifacts of
the relatively small sarnple/size of 20'that was used in the experiments in order'to' keep the
graphical determination,and analysis of trade network formations manageable. More testing
is needed here. ,
Second, the optimality criteria commonly used to evaluate the performance of Gale-
Shapley matching mechanisms in static market contexts—namely, Pareto optimality and
pairwise stability—proved to be highly incomplete indicators of performance in the evo
lutionary market context of the" current studyl' As repeatedly seen in the computational
experiments repdrted' in Section 5,' all of which rely oh'Gale-Shapiey'matching, trade net
work formation'and trade behavior are systematically related '^to market structure and to
ex ante capacity constraints as reflected in the relative and absolute'sizes of the buyer of
fer quota bq aiid the seller acceptance'quota s'q: Moreover, transactions costs-(negative R
payofFs)j and inactivity costs (0 wallflower payoifs)i are'important determining factors in the
formation of trade networks; and these costs can cause social welfare to .be low even if all
active traders are persistent cqoperators. , •' i-i ^ ,
These observations suggest that matching behavior and trade behavior should,be studied
conjointly in dynamic market contexts. Yet even thismay not provide sufficient flexibility for
the understanding of real-world markets. In the current study, for example, traders adapt
both their matdiing behavior and their trade behavior in response to trade interactions
in each trade 'cycle, but only trade strategies are permitted to evolve' structurally. The
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structure of the market and the rules by whidi matching takes place are assumed to be
given exogenously. In real-world market contexts, however, market structure, matching
mechanisms, and trade strategies simultaneously coevolve, and for good reason: aU three
interdependent facets strongly affect market performance.
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(EC =.23)
(c) Tight Capacity
(EC = -1/2)
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(b) Zero Excess Capacity
, • " (EC.=-0) •• _," "
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(d) Extremely Tight Capacity
(EC = -23/24)
Figure 1: Base Trade Patterns for Endogenous-Type Economies with Different
Ex Ante Ciapacities. A relatively larger box for'a-trader type" indicates that this trader
type achieves a relatively higher FIT value in the realized economies whose trade patterns
approximate the base trade pattern. -
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Figure 2: Stability, Check for an Endogenous-Type Economy., The maximum, min
imum, and average fitness scores are graphed for trader generations 1 through 100.
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Figure 3; Base Trade Patterns for Two-Sided Economies with.Different Ex Ante
Capacities.,Arelatively^larger box for a trader type indicates that this trader type achieves
a relatively .higher FIT value in the reahzed, economies whose trade patterns approximate
the base trade pattern. , ;q ,;v , -
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Figure 4: Base Trade Patterns for Partially-Fluid Economies with Different Ex
Ante Capacities. A relatively larger box for a trader type indicates that this trader
type achieves a relatively higher FIT value in the realized economies whose trade patterns
approximate the base trade pattern.
